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ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS:  
BODY SCANNERS, IS SALUS POPULI 
SUPREME LEX1 THE ANSWER? 
 
Victoria Sutton
†
 
INTRODUCTION TO THE TSA BODY SCANNER POLICY 
 
The body scanning device, used at some airports to view through 
passenger’s clothing to the surface of the skin, is considered to be a 
major improvement toward ensuring that weapons or explosives are 
not carried onto commercial aircraft, making airline travel safer, and 
the nation more secure.  In the ten years since September 11, 2001, 
airport security has become increasingly invasive.  Air passengers 
must now choose either a full-body scan or a very thorough pat-down.  
If a traveler opts for the body scan, she must step into a room-like 
enclosure, hold her hands above her head, and allow the body scanner 
device to produce a nude image of her. An agent of the Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA), in a room situated away from the 
scanning area, examines the scan and “clears” the person if there is no 
problem, at which point the TSA personnel with the passenger will 
give her permission to proceed on her journey.  If anything suspicious 
is discovered, the TSA personnel conduct a pat down or perhaps de-
tain the passenger for questioning. 
The body scanners purchased and installed by the Transportation 
Security Agency are of two kinds of technologies.  The first is 
backscatter technology and the second is millimeter wave technology.  
Backscatter technology works by photographing the pattern of the 
  
  1 The maxim salus populi suprema lex is the law of all courts and countries 
and is a well-recognized principle of law and means that “the individual right sinks in 
the necessity to provide for the public good.  The only question has been, as to the 
extent of the powers that should be conferred for such purposes,” Haverty v. Bass, 66 
Me. 71, 74 (1876). 
  † Victoria Sutton, MPA, PhD, JD is the Director of the Center for Biode-
fense, Law and Public Policy and Horn Professor of Texas Tech University School of 
Law.  Her Ph.D. work focused on risk perception.  She also served as the former 
Chief Counsel of the Research and Innovative Technology Administration of the U.S. 
Dept of Transportation (2005-7) and former Assistant Director, Office of Science and 
Technology Policy, the Executive Office of the President (1990-93). 
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photons bouncing off of certain materials, revealing its shape, when 
digitized and shown on a monitor to TSA personnel.  This comes from 
a low intensity x-ray delivered to the body, the interface of the tech-
nology with the human body.  The millimeter wave technology oper-
ates similarly, but uses non-ionizing radiation in the radio wavelength 
area to bombard the body and record the bouncing of the waves from 
materials or objects on the body.  Whether the amount of radiation 
exposure is significant enough to warrant warnings to the public and 
employees has not been clearly articulated or communicated, and 
therefore possibly not clearly determined. 
The body scanner policy raises a number of legal questions which 
at first impression are fairly obvious ones, but there are others, not so 
obvious.  First, does the value of the scanner information and its con-
tribution to airline safety outweigh the burden on the individual giving 
up privacy by revealing a clear outline and the contours of their body 
to an individual employed by TSA and with no specific legal assur-
ances that it will not become an archival record?  Framed in its consti-
tutionally grounded principle of privacy, this is the question most of-
ten asked.  Is the privacy interest always the same, or does the interest 
change when the compelling state interest is national security? 
Second, do we need to ask if the body scan is a reasonable search 
and seizure or does the passenger hold such a diminished expectation 
of privacy in this activity that the Fourth Amendment protections 
against unreasonable search and seizure are not triggered?  
Third, does the right to travel heighten the burden on the govern-
ment to demonstrate that the body scanner does not present an unrea-
sonable invasion of the privacy interest, or pose an unreasonable 
search or seizure or is the right to travel so narrowly interpreted as a 
fundamental right as to not be infringed when there is another route to 
reach your destination?  Or to what extent does the inconvenience of 
lengthier ground transportation to that of air travel create such a bur-
den on the right to travel as to be a coercion and a constitutional in-
fringement on a fundamental right? 
Fourth, the question could be asked if authorities have been ex-
ceeded under either of two theories.  Has TSA exceeded the statutory 
authority in implementing body scanning devices, or has Congress 
given away too much action of a legislative nature to the Executive 
Branch?  The judiciary has not found any action by Congress to have 
given too much legislative authority to an agency in what has been 
called the non-delegation doctrine, since 1935;
2
 and rarely does a 
court determine that an agency has gone beyond the powers delegated 
  
 2 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), 
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to it in a statute in an, ultra vires claim.  But even when a convincing 
argument has been made that the agency has exceeded their authority 
given them in the statute, the court has simply asked that the agency 
go back and rethink their interpretation and issue a revised action, 
rather than invalidate the regulation.
3
 
Fifth, did the TSA give notice to the public about the use of the 
body scanners in a procedurally meaningful way?  The Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA) requires a notice and comment process for sub-
stantive actions.
4
  Has TSA violated this provision of the APA and 
thereby denied those affected by the scanners due process?   
Sixth, is there any analogous use of technology that is used for na-
tional security purposes, yet has potential health effects?  That ques-
tion is easily answered for military personnel, where personal health 
risks are outweighed by national security interests when the circum-
stances are severe enough and immediate enough, as in the anthrax 
vaccination program.  However, there was never a severe or immedi-
ate enough risk to require anthrax vaccinations of civilians.  The 
smallpox vaccination legislation which implemented smallpox vac-
cinations for the public was quickly abandoned as the perception of 
risk faded, changing the balance in the balancing test.   
Seventh, finally, if the body scanners do pose a risk, and will be 
utilized the same as a diagnostic test, which is classified as a device 
under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), has it been 
adequately evaluated to be used on the public through the FDCA ap-
proval process for non-medical radiation emitting devices?
5
 
TSA might respond with these arguments: (1) that the privacy in-
terest is not infringed because the compelling state interest in national 
security is high when balanced against the privacy burden on the indi-
vidual traveler; (2) that there is no need to do a further reasonable 
search and seizure analysis because the reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy is not exceeded by the body scanner in the context of traveling 
on an airline in post 9/11 America; (3) the right to travel is a funda-
mental right that is not infringed where there is the option to take an-
other travel route; and (4) TSA has not exceeded the statutory authori-
ty delegated to it by Congress by utilizing body scanning technology; 
and (5) no procedural due process was needed, because it is not a 
rulemaking procedure; and (6) the national security interest outweighs 
even the non-military privacy interest, because it is the highest of 
governmental interests; and (7) FDA has provided a webpage with 
information about the safety of the body scanner devices.   
  
 3    Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457 (2001). 
 4  5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). 
 5 See Federal Food Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2012). 
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TSA’s incorporation of body scanners into their statutory screen-
ing duty to utilize technology to achieve the most safety for airline 
travel as possible, poses an unprecedented exposure to radiation by 
the federal government.  Even if the TSA prevails on its argument that 
no rulemaking was necessary because the body scanners are internal 
operating procedures which are exempt from rulemaking procedural 
due process, there is one more question that must be asked.   
 
 
I.  CHALLENGES TO THE TSA BODY SCANNER POLICY 
 
The development of the body scanner program in airports began 
in 2007 as a way to do secondary screening of passengers, after they 
had passed through a magnetometer for metal detection.  But after 
TSA decided to expand the use of the body scanners for field testing 
to certain airports in 2009, it very quickly moved to institute the pro-
gram as a primary means of scanning in early 2010.  By the end of 
2010, TSA had 486 scanners at 78 airports, with plans to add 500 
more before the end of 2011.
6
 
The legal challengers to the TSA’s body-scanning policy as an 
unreasonable search have come from two groups, airline pilots
7
 and 
passengers.
8
  Their cases were heard within two days of each other, 
and both were dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  Re-
view of orders issued by TSA is within the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the U.S. Court of Appeals.  One of the opinions noted that the U.S. 
Court of Appeals in the District of Columbia had heard oral argu-
ments on the body scanner policy, and that a decision from the court 
with substantive jurisdiction would be forthcoming, indicating that 
there should be some resolution of these issues although not heard in 
this court.  Less than two weeks later, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia, in Electronic Privacy Information Center v. 
United States Department of Homeland Security, held that the action 
taken by TSA was substantive and should have been subjected to the 
rulemaking process under the APA.
9
  The court, rather than invalidat-
ing the TSA’s action because of broader policy concerns,10 directed 
the TSA to start over and follow the formal rulemaking process.  In a 
  
 6 See Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U. S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 653 F.3d 
1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 7 Roberts v. Napolitano, 798 F. Supp.2d 7 (D.D.C. 2011). 
 8 Durso v. Napolitano, 795 F. Supp.2d 63 (D.D.C. 2011). 
 9 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 3.  See also 5 U.S.C. § 553. 
 10 The court did not vacate the rule because it would “severely disrupt an 
essential security operation . . . and [the rule] is otherwise lawful . . . .” Id. at 6. 
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surprising response, TSA asked the court to “make clear that on re-
mand” that they could use the ‘good cause’ exception to rulemaking,11 
and that they would not be precluded from invoking another exception 
to the rulemaking process in light of the court’s decision, to which the 
court simply said that question was not reached by the court.
12
  At this 
time, the TSA has not responded with a notice of proposed rulemak-
ing. 
 
 
II.  WHAT QUESTIONS SHOULD BE ASKED?  
 
A. Privacy Interest, the Public Health Interest, and 
the National Security Interest   
 
The privacy interest when weighed against a national security in-
terest is one of the least favorable ones for the privacy interest because 
the national security interest is so high.  Are all substantial govern-
mental interests the same?  The case law suggests that they are not.  
Public health has been established as one of the duties of state 
government in Gibbons v. Ogden as distinct from those of the federal 
government, wherein the court explained that health laws are part of 
the body of laws that were not surrendered by states.
13
  Going further, 
the United States Supreme Court has also found that public health is 
one of the important duties of states, for example.  As the Supreme 
Court held in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, the protection and preserva-
tion of the public health is among the most important duties of state 
government.
14
 
Our constitutional principle of federalism requires that interests of 
national security are fundamental to the role of national government.  
Indeed, the Constitution begins with that mandate: “The People of the 
United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Jus-
tice, insure domestic Tranquility provide for the common defence . . . 
do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of 
America . . . .”15  This power is “delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution . . . ,”16 and Congress has the power “[t]o provide for 
  
 11 The exception states that “when the agency for good cause finds . . . that 
notice and public procedure theron are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the 
public interest,” then the agency does not have to engage in the rulemaking process.  
5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B) (2012). 
 12 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 8. 
            13  Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 205 (1824). 
             14  Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
 15 U.S. CONST., pmbl. 
 16 Id., amend X. 
448 HEALTH MATRIX [Vol. 22: 443]  
calling forth the Militia . . . and repel invasions . . . .”17  James Madi-
son suggested in The Federalist Papers that “[s]tate legislatures will 
be unlikely to attach themselves sufficiently to national objects . . . 
,”18 interpreting the national security interest to fall clearly within the 
power of the national government. 
The national security interest was first invoked in a First Amend-
ment case of free speech, Schenck v. United States, where Justice 
Holmes articulated the test which allowed the restriction of the fun-
damental right of free speech for the compelling state interest of na-
tional security based upon the “clear and present danger” test.19   
More recent cases portray the national security interest as the 
most important of any governmental interest.  The Supreme Court 
held in Haig v. Agee that, “[i]t is ‘obvious and unarguable’ that no 
governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Na-
tion.”20  According to another more recent perspective, “it is frequent-
ly said that national security is the most basic requirement of any so-
ciety.  The argument is that all other interests are dependent on the 
preservation of the nation itself and hence all such interests must be 
subordinated to national security.”21  Thus, the national security inter-
est is greater than a public health interest, except when the public 
health interest is also a national security interest, which is a recent 
development in our understanding of national security law.  Given the 
high interest that public health assumes when combined with national 
security interest, how will that change our analysis with the body 
scanner policy, if any? 
 
B. Fourth Amendment Protection against              
Unreasonable Search and Seizure 
 
The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution provides that “the 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”22 
  
 17 Id., art. I, § 8, cl. 15. 
 18 THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 298 (James Madison) (Clifford Rossiter ed. 
1961). 
 19 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
 20 Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (quoting Aptheker v. Secretary of 
State, 378 U.S. 500, 509 (1964)). 
 21 Thomas I. Emerson, Symposium: National Security and Civil Liberties: 
Introduction, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 685, 685 (1984). 
 22 U.S. CONST., amend. IV. 
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Airport searches are subject to the limitations of Fourth Amend-
ment.  The “Terry stop” from Terry v. Ohio is the legal authority for 
the need to do immediate searches without the need to obtain a war-
rant,
23
 yet courts have been unconvinced that this would apply to air-
port searches.
24
  However, case law has developed to conclude that 
there is an implied consent by passengers when they buy a ticket and 
choose to travel by air.  The specific application in airport searches is 
also well developed in the case law.  The Ninth Circuit has held the 
justification for warrantless searches to be done at the implied consent 
of the passenger.
25
  More recently, the Ninth Circuit found that pur-
chasing a ticket with the intent to fly is implied consent to be 
searched.
26
 
Early cases dealing with airport searches dealt with the question 
of whether private action was the same as public conduct when securi-
ty screening was handled by private airlines and contractors, and be-
fore the establishment of the federal government agency, the Trans-
portation Security Administration. 
Airport searches have long been identified as “administrative 
searches,” and this was confirmed recently in Electronic Privacy In-
formation Center v. United States Department of Homeland Security 
in July 2011, where the court held that “the primary goal is not to de-
termine whether any passenger has committed a crime but rather to 
protect the public from a terrorist attack.”27   Further the search must 
be “no more extensive nor intensive than necessary, in the light of 
current technology, to detect the presence of weapons or explosives . . 
. .”28  Passengers “may avoid the search by electing not to fly.”29 
Passengers and pilots challenged the body scanner policy, charac-
terizing it as an “order,”30 which is reviewable by U.S. Courts of Ap-
  
 23 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 24 United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 at 905–8 (9th Cir. 1973). 
 25 United States v. Homburg, 546 F.2d 1350, 1352 (9th Cir. 1976).  In Davis, 
the court “held that the justification for warrantless screening searches is the implied 
consent of the passenger.”  482 F.2d at 913. 
 26 United States v. Aukai, 440 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated en banc 
497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 27 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U. S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 653 F.3d 1, 
10 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 958–63 (9th Cir. 
2007) (en banc)). 
 28 Davis, 482, F.2d at 913. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Roberts v. Napolitano, 798 F. Supp.2d 7, 10 (D.D.C. 2011).  An “order” 
for review under 49 U.S.C. § 46110 requires that the agency determination be final, 
but also “it ‘must determine rights or obligations or give risk to legal consequences.” 
Id. (quoting Safe Extensions, Inc. v. FAA, 509 F.3d 593, 598 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (cita-
tion omitted)). 
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peal which has exclusive jurisdiction.
31
  In both cases, the passengers 
and pilots asked the courts to review the constitutionality of the body 
scanner policy with regard to whether it failed to protect persons 
against unreasonable searches and seizures.  However, in both cases, 
the plaintiffs filed their complaints in the U.S. District Courts, where 
the court had to dismiss them based on jurisdictional reasons, never 
reaching the search and seizure question.   
 
C. Right to Travel 
 
The courts have held that the “constitutional right to travel may 
not be conditioned upon the relinquishment of another . . . right.” 32  
As the court opined, a compelling government interest must exist and 
the search cannot be based upon consent alone.
33
 
The burden on the traveler’s right to travel must be greater than 
the governmental interest to find a constitutional infringement on the 
right.  If there can be a quantitative way of measuring this burden, 
surely a recent Gallup poll comes as close as any to a fit.  A Gallup 
poll reveals that more than three-fourths of travelers approve of full 
body scanners.  In a Gallup poll conducted in January 2010, 78 per-
cent of a sample of people who had traveled two or more times during 
the past year said they approved of full body scanners in airports.
34
  
But is this the right question to ask, if travelers are unaware of the 
health burden, only the convenience factor is being considered in the 
individual’s burden analysis because they don’t have the information 
to make a decision about the health choice? 
The true voluntariness of an airport search is far from conclusive.  
While a passenger is not compelled to travel by air, many travelers 
would be reasonable to conclude that there is really no viable alterna-
tive.  The question of where voluntariness ends and coercion begins, 
is where the right to travel is burdened.  However, where the compel-
ling governmental interest is national security, the infringement on the 
individual right to travel will have to be extremely heavy to outweigh 
the national security interest.  This suggests that body scanners will 
continue to be utilized due to their extremely light burden on travel 
  
 31 49 U.S.C. § 46110(c) provides for review exclusively by U.S. Court of 
Appeals to “affirm, amend, modify, or set aside any part of . . . .” a TSA order. 
 32 United States v. $124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d 1240, 1248 n.8 (9th 
Cir. 1989) (quoting Davis, 482 F.2d at 913). 
 33 $124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d at 1248 n.8. 
 34 Jeffrey M. Jones, In U.S., Air Travelers Take Body Scans in Stride, 
GALLUP POLITICS (Jan. 11, 2010), http://www.gallup.com/poll/125018/air-travelers-
body-scans-stride.aspx. 
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and privacy when weighed against a national security interest directly 
served by searching passengers for dangerous possessions. 
 
D. Ultra Vires Challenges to Agencies Acting Within 
the Scope of Their Authority 
 
The TSA was created by the Transportation and Aviation Security 
Act of 2001 “to prevent terrorist attacks and reduce the vulnerability 
of the United States to terrorism within the nation’s transportation 
networks.”35  The Administrator of TSA is charged with “the overall 
responsibility for civil aviation security.”36  Further, Congress directed 
the head of TSA to provide for the screening of all passengers and 
property before boarding aircraft to ensure that no passenger is unlaw-
fully carrying a dangerous weapon, explosive or other destructive 
substance.  The Administrator must give “high priority to developing, 
testing, improving and deploying” technologies at airport screening 
checkpoints to detect “nonmetallic, chemical, biological, and radio-
logical weapons, and explosives, in all forms, on individuals and in 
their personal property,” including such weapons and explosives that 
“terrorists would likely try to smuggle aboard.”37 
TSA has the authority to use the body scanning devices most re-
cently by statute by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 
Act of 2004.
38
 
TSA’s delegated authority is clearly for passenger screening as 
well as research and development of new technologies for that pur-
pose.  If the agency has exceeded the statutory authority in imple-
menting body scanning devices, the judiciary has not found any agen-
cy exceeding their statutory authority in an ultra vires claim, since 
1935,
39
 so it is unlikely.  But even when a convincing argument has 
been made that the agency has exceeded the authority given them in 
the statute, the court has simply asked that the agency go back and 
rethink their interpretation, rather than invalidate the regulation.
40
 
 
 
  
 35 Redfern v. Napolitano, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49321 at *2 (citation omit-
ted)). 
 36 Id.  See also 49 U.S.C. §§ 114(a)-(b), (d) (2012). 
 37 49 U.S.C. § 44925(a) (2012). 
 38 Id.; Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U. S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 653 F.3d 
1, 2 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 39 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), 
 40 Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457 (2001). 
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E. Fifth Amendment, Procedural Due Process 
 
The Constitution requires procedural due process before the gov-
ernment can pronounce laws affecting the interests of persons.
41
  Pro-
cedural due process protects individuals by providing that they cannot 
“be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law.”42  When a federal government agency engages in rulemaking, 
the APA ensures that basic procedural protections are followed for 
any substantive changes to the rules, or any binding agency action.
43
 
The determination by the D.C. Circuit in Electronic Privacy In-
formation Center v. United States Department of Homeland Security 
made clear that the action taken by the TSA in instituting the body 
scanner policy was actually a “rulemaking” and should have been 
subjected to the notice-and-comment rulemaking process prescribed 
by the APA.
44
  Specifically the court held that the decision to institute 
body scanners was one which should have been subjected to notice-
and-comment rulemaking.
45
  First, the court held that the TSA’s body 
scanner policy is not merely an “interpretation” because “it substan-
tially changes the experience of airline passengers and is therefore not 
merely ‘interpretive’ . . . .”46  The court next held that it was not mere-
ly a “general statement of policy” because “an agency pronouncement 
will be considered binding as a practical matter if it either appears on 
its face to be binding . . . or is applied by the agency in a way that 
indicates it is binding.”47  Further, the affected parties (travelers) be-
lieve it is binding and are “‘reasonably led to believe that failure to 
conform will bring adverse consequences.’”48  The court then con-
cluded that the TSA’s body scanner the policy is a substantive rule, 
subject to the constraints of the notice and comment rulemaking pro-
cess, because it “substantively affects the public to a degree sufficient 
to implicate the policy interest animating notice-and-comment rule-
making.”49 
  
 41 U.S. CONST., amend. V. 
 42 Id. 
 43 5 U.S.C. §553 (2012). 
 44 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U. S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 653 F.3d 1, 3 
(D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 45 Id. at 11. 
 46 Id. at 7. 
 47 Id. (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 290 F.3d 377, 383 (D.C.Cir. 2002) 
(citations omitted)). 
 48 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 5 (quoting Gen. Elec. Co., 290 F.3d at 
383–84 (citation omitted)).  
 49 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 6. 
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The TSA needs to subject this new policy to the notice and com-
ment procedures laid forth in the APA.  Providing the proper proce-
dural due process will help ensure that the substance of the policy is 
legitimate and makes good use of federal resources in very sensitive 
and important areas—the safety of air passengers and broad national 
security concerns. 
F. Civilians v. Military and Privacy  
 
There is a small but significant difference between military and 
civilian rights when weighed against the national security interest, the 
theory being that by voluntarily joining the military, those individual 
interests are by consent, diminished.   This is through the waiver of 
consent by the President
50
 for unapproved drugs and devices on behalf 
of the enlisted members of the military service when it is warranted by 
national security interests.   
The military anthrax vaccination policy initiated after the anthrax 
attacks of 2001 was not sustainable, as the perceived threat of another 
attack diminished and evidence of a more serious burden on individu-
al health emerged.  That program ended, even with this waiver of con-
sent by the President for the interests of national security. 
G. The Public Health Perspective on Body Scanners  
 
A unique public-private partnership exists which establishes a 
wide range of standards for commercial products.  The American Na-
tional Standards Institute (ANSI), a private sector organization, con-
venes groups of experts to create standards for everything from gaso-
line pump nozzles to radiation-emitting body scanning devices.  The 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), a government 
agency, then adopts those standards for governmental regulatory and 
compliance purposes.  ANSI organizes groups of experts who work in 
the manufacture of the technologies and are familiar with the stand-
ards generally considered acceptable.  NIST, in cooperation with 
  
 50 10 U.S.C. 1107(f)(1) (“In the case of the administration of an investigation-
al new drug or drug unapproved for its applied use to a member of the armed forces in 
connection with the member’s participation in a particular military operation, the 
requirement that the member provide prior consent to receive the drug in accordance 
with the prior consent requirement imposed under section 505(i)(4) of the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. 355(i)(4) may be waived only by the Presi-
dent.  The President may grant such a waiver only if the President determines, in 
writing, that obtaining consent is not in the interests of national security.”)            
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ANSI, promulgates standards that address issues of, not only safety, 
but also uniformity for commercial purposes.
51
 
In the case of radiation-emitting devices for security screening, 
ANSI has developed (and NIST adopted) standards through its Na-
tional Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP) in 
coordination with the Health Physicists Society (HPS).  In this partic-
ular area, the Food and Drug Administration which regulates non-
medical radiation emitting devices, also adopts the standards devel-
oped by ANSI/HPS through the NCRP in this public-private partner-
ship.
52
 
In addition to this regulatory process, the federal government es-
tablished the Interagency Steering Committee on Radiation Standards 
(ISCORS) 
 
to foster early resolution and coordination of regulatory issues associated 
with radiation standards and guidelines. The Committee has not been 
delegated any authorities established by law, regulation, Executive Or-
der, or other administrative mechanisms to act in lieu of formal agency 
action. The Committee works to facilitate information exchange and 
produces various documents.
53
 
 
In July 2008, after about a year of testing body scanners as a sec-
ondary screening method, the ISCORS published a report entitled 
Guidance for Security Screening of Humans Utilizing Ionizing Radia-
tion.  ISCORS also represented the document as guidance for making 
decisions about using such devices.  At about the same time another 
independent review was being done by NIST.  The report was pre-
pared and dated July 9, 2008 by NIST, assessing radiation and com-
pliance of a body scanner with the ANSI standard.
54
 
The FDA has contributed to the dialogue by creating a webpage 
for information on the body scanners which is the only place that the 
  
 51 See generally NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY LAB, PROCEDURES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN 
NATIONAL STANDARDS (2008), available at 
http://www.itl.nist.gov/ANSIASD/NISTITLANSProcedures-
ReaccreditedMarch182008.pdf. 
 52 See generally Our Mission, NAT’L COUNCIL ON RADIATION PROTECTION & 
MEASUREMENTS, http://www.ncrponline.org/AboutNCRP/Our_Mission.html (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2012). 
 53 U. S. INTERAGENCY STEERING COMM. ON RADIATION STANDARDS, 
GUIDANCE FOR SECURITY SCREENING OF HUMANS UTILIZING IONIZING RADIATION, 
(July 2008), available at http://www.iscors.org/doc/GSSHUIR%20July%202008.pdf. 
   54 AM. NAT’L STANDARD N43.17: RADIATION SAFETY FOR PERSONNEL SECURITY 
SCREENING SYSTEMS USING X-RAYS (Am. Nat’l Standards Inst. 2002). 
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public can go to see anything about the body scanner’s effects on 
health.
55
 
The opacity of information related to radiation emitted by the 
body scanners comes from security concerns on the part of the TSA.   
It has redacted much of the information that explains the extent of the 
radiation produced by body scanners, and how deeply the radiation 
penetrates.  Its actions in withholding this information in response to a 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request were upheld by the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia.
56
  Lowering of standards 
might also raise questions with the timing for the change in the allow-
able standard for radiation dose per screening from 10 millirems in 
2002 to 25 millirems in 2009, the standard allowing more radiation 
per dose by two and a half times from the 2002
57
 standard to the 
2009
58
 standard.   The ISCORS guidance includes the previous lower 
standard, 10 millirems per dose because the new 2009 standard had 
not yet been published.  Assume we accept the 2009 higher standard 
of 25 millirems as the acceptable dose for each exposure then we must 
also accept that there will be some health effect, that will be more than 
negligible which has been found to be 1,000 millirems annually, ac-
cording to the ANSI/CHRP Report 116
59
 upon which these decisions 
have relied, in part.  This information alone, demands that a consid-
eration of the governmental interest balanced against the risk be done. 
 
 
IV. SEARCHING FOR PRECEDENT:  VACCINATION AS A MODEL 
 
If the decision to use body scanners was based on a national secu-
rity interest which has been determined to outweigh its potential nega-
tive health effects on human health, then are there any precedential 
analogous situations which might be useful in our analysis?  Examin-
ing the example of the childhood vaccinations requirement should 
  
55 Radiation Emitting Products: Products for Security Screening of People, 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Radiation-
EmittingProd-
ucts/RadiationEmittingProductsandProcedures/SecuritySystems/ucm227201.htm (last 
updated Dec. 23, 2010). 
56 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U. S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 760 F.Supp. 
2d 4, 7 (D.D.C. 2011). 
57 AM. NAT’L STANDARD N43.17: RADIATION SAFETY FOR PERSONNEL SECURITY 
SCREENING SYSTEMS USING X-RAYS (Am. Nat’l Standards Inst. 2002). 
58
 ANSI N43.17: RADIATION SAFETY FOR PERSONNEL SECURITY SCREENING 
SYSTEMS USING X-RAY OR GAMMA RADIATION (Am. Nat’l Standards Inst. 2009). 
59 NAT’L COUNCIL ON RADIATION PROTECTION & MEASUREMENT, REPORT NO. 
116 – LIMITATION OF EXPOSURE TO IONIZING RADIATION (1993). 
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give insight into those cases when a privacy interest in the form of a 
health interest must be weighed against a substantial governmental 
interest, in this case public health and the prevention of epidemics.  
This is not a perfect analogy because while the first part of the test is a 
privacy interest, the governmental interest is public health and not 
national security.  In Part III there are indications that the national 
security interest is the most compelling and important of the govern-
mental interests which would be more compelling than the public 
health interest, alone.   
Like a vaccination program, could the body scanner policy be re-
quired as part of a Public Health Emergency declaration, thereby 
changing the analysis?  A Public Health Emergency (PHE) can be 
declared under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act 
of 2005
60
 the first one was declared on October 1, 2008 for the an-
thrax vaccine.  These declarations are primarily to provide immunity 
to the manufacturer of the countermeasure, which could have been 
purchased pursuant to the Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering Effec-
tive Technologies Act of 2002 (SAFETY Act), which provides for 
waivers of immunity in declared emergencies.
61
  The Food, Drug and 
Cosmetic Act can then be triggered by the PHE to issue their own 
agency’s order to authorize products for use in emergencies,62 which 
might include the body scanner device, which is in their jurisdictional 
scope for approval of non-medical radiation emitting devices. 
Key elements in the declaration state that pursuant to Section 
319F-3 of the Public Health Service Act, (this provision originating 
from the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act of 2005) 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services may declare a public 
health emergency.
63
  The declared purpose and reason typically read: 
“Therefore, pursuant to section 319F-3(b) of the Act, I have deter-
mined there is a credible risk that the threat . . . constitutes a public 
health emergency.”64 
Returning to the analysis of the public health threat that is also a 
national security interest, there are several examples of this analysis 
and five examples of a PHE.  The analysis for the smallpox vaccina-
tion program in 2003, was a case where vaccination burdens were 
weighed against a national security interest which was also a public 
  
 60 42 U.S.C. § 247d–6d (2011). 
 61 6 U.S.C. §§ 441–444 (2011). 
 62 21 U.S.C. § 360 bbb–3 (2011). 
 63 42 U.S.C. § 247d–6d. 
 64 Kathleen Sebelius, Determination that a Public Health Emergency Exists, 
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (Mar. 22, 2010), 
http://www.hhs.gov/secretary/phe_swh1n1.html. 
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health interest in the Smallpox Emergency Personnel Protection Act 
of 2003 (SEPPA).
65
  Other actions have involved the same govern-
mental interest in national security interest where it was also a public 
health interest: the Public Health Emergency Declaration of October 
1, 2008 for anthrax, and in five other declarations of a Public Health 
Emergency for H1N1.
66
  The analysis for the body scanner policy then 
changes from the privacy interest in a search and seizure (which is 
very low) being outweighed by a national security interest to a test 
where the privacy interest in health is outweighed by a national secu-
rity interest which is also a public health interest (an interest in avert-
ing death from an undiscovered WMD).  If the last test is used, then 
utilizing a Public Health Emergency declaration would obfuscate 
claims of a rulemaking failure and in addition could waive potential 
liability to the manufacturers of the body scanners, and claims of a 
rulemaking failure. 
The constitutional test with childhood vaccinations begins with 
weighing the privacy interest, in which is embodied a personal health 
interest, against the substantial governmental interest of public health.  
Although there is a risk to the individual child receiving the vaccina-
tion of mild to severe health consequences, including death, the bene-
fit of preventing widespread childhood disease epidemics has been 
determined to be the most important interest.  For example, a small-
pox vaccine required for children until 1974, resulted in one death for 
each million children vaccinated, but a risk that was considerably bet-
ter than a smallpox epidemic with a 30 percent mortality rate. 
Could you apply the same test to the body scanners policy?  The 
privacy interest is very analogous – a risk of injury to health from 
both the vaccinations and the body scanners; however the substantial 
governmental interest is not the same.  The substantial governmental 
interest in the vaccination case is protecting public health; whereas, 
the substantial public interest in the body scanners is protecting na-
tional security.  However the public health interest is evolving into a 
national security governmental interest in a number of recent cases.  
For example, there have been at least six Public Health Emergencies 
(PHE) declared by the President using the authority of the Public 
Health Act
67
 which sites the governmental reason that “a public health 
emergency exists nationwide involving Swine Influenza A (now 
called 2009 H1N1 flu) that affects or has significant potential to affect 
  
 65 Pub. L. No. 108-20, 117 Stat. 642 (2003) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 66 Sebelius, supra note 65. 
             67 42 U.S.C § 247d (2011). 
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national security.”68  This declaration removed product liability claims 
for countermeasures that could be developed and purchased by the 
government in response to the declared PHE, which might be tamiflu-
like products or vaccinations.  The first such declaration was for the 
declaration of a public health emergency for anthrax attacks, and it is 
still in effect until December 2015.
69
  Thus, vaccinations in this con-
text would be the burden on the privacy interest or health interest bal-
anced against national security, rather than public health. 
If we can now conclude that the privacy interest in a health inter-
est in the burden of body scanners is outweighed by a national securi-
ty interest which is also a public health interest can we also conclude 
that it is analogous to the anthrax vaccine and the national security 
interest in public health emergency declarations?  If so, TSA could 
utilize the declaration of a Public Health Emergency for using body 
scanners to prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction in passen-
ger air transportation, instead of a rulemaking. 
 
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
Returning to the original question, posited in the title, whether we 
are asking the right questions, is salus populi supreme lex
70
 the simple 
answer?  Simply subordinating individual interests to the public good 
does not exist in the pure form that the Supreme Court articulated in 
1876, when they sought to define the powers of the federal govern-
ment.  Now the question has become one of a balancing test of wheth-
er the national security interest is sufficiently served to balance the 
burden on individual rights.  The burden on individual rights can be 
characterized as either one of convenience or public health.  The an-
swer must be yes, however, the mechanism of the PHE remains unre-
viewable.  The burden on convenience is easily answered in a poll of 
the public, and that answer was that 78 percent of the people support 
it.  However, if the burden is on health, not convenience, freedom to 
travel, privacy against search and seizure, then the question is one 
  
68 Sebelius, supra note 65.   
69   Declaration Under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness 
Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 58,239–58,242 (Oct. 6, 2008). 
70  The maxim salus populi suprema lex is the law of all courts and countries 
and is a well-recognized principle of law and means that “the individual right sinks in 
the necessity to provide for the public good.  The only question has been, as to the 
extent of the powers that should be conferred for such purposes,” Haverty v. Bass, 66 
Me. 71, 74 (1876). 
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which must consider the impact to health and the certainty and the 
urgency of the governmental interest in national security. 
If the body scanner policy is understood within the framework of 
a PHE, then the federal government can avoid the constraints of the 
balancing test.  A public health interest can be the same as a national 
security interest in some cases, which is then balanced against the 
individual’s health burden, may fall into the new jurisprudence of 
national security interests as public health interests.   
While individuals in the military have a diminished right of priva-
cy in health interests, the balancing test of individual privacy in health 
was outweighed by the national security interest in the anthrax vac-
cination program.  Even that balance was changed, as the perceived 
threat of an anthrax attack decreased in urgency and magnitude.  The 
balance changed to weigh more heavily the individual health interest, 
and the program was stopped.  Non-military individuals do not have 
diminished individual rights or interests, nor has the public consented 
to the waiver of any of them.  Therefore the balancing of the per-
ceived threat to national security will have to be substantial to sustain 
a burden for very long on the public, and that applies to the body 
scanner policy.  SEPPA is another example of a quickly diminished 
national security interest, yielding to a private health interest, ending 
the program.
71
  
So while the national security interest is the greatest of all gov-
ernmental interests, it must be at a heightened and urgent level to sus-
tain a burden on the private health interest. 
The answer then, is that there are two choices with the body scan-
ner policy. The body scanner policy can be analyzed as a national 
security interest which will almost certainly outweigh the individual 
privacy interest, but could be sustainable only so long as the perceived 
threat is high enough to balance the individual burden.  The individual 
health interest weighed against the national security interest when it is 
also characterized as a public health interest (aversion of death by a 
WMD on an aircraft), could be ordered through a Public Health 
Emergency declaration using the President’s power, and the program 
could be sustainable for the foreseeable future without judicial review, 
since the review of a President’s decision is extraordinary.  The choic-
es then are the more heavy-handed approach to declare a Public 
Health Emergency, and avoid the individual rights balancing test as 
well as the rulemaking process altogether, because it is no longer a 
rulemaking.  Or, TSA could follow the advice of the Court of Appeals 
  
 71 Pub. L. No. 108-20, 117 Stat. 642 (2003) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
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in Electronic Privacy Information Center v. United States Department 
of Homeland Security, and proceed to a rulemaking process, to ade-
quately give notice to the public about the details of the impacts to 
health, and graciously accept the Court’s decision not to invalidate the 
entire program in the interim, while once the rulemaking process fin-
ishes, it cures the constitutional procedural due process defect.  
    
